The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court by Martin, Andrew D. et al.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 83
Number 5 Locating the Constitutional Center, Centrist









Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 1275
(2005).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol83/iss5/6
THE MEDIAN JUSTICE ON THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT'
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Black's "Median Voter Theorem" now figures prominently and
crucially in a wide array of research on the United States Supreme
Court, from studies on the nomination and confirmation of Justices,
to investigations into the Court's resolution of disputes, to analyses
of its impact on the hierarchy of justice. Nonetheless, and
regardless of the substantive focus of the investigation, the question
of how to locate the median Justice looms large. Because all extant
answers have their share of problems, we set out to develop a more
compelling approach-one that relies on methods developed by
Martin and Quinn. Via this approach we derive a systematic
accounting of the Justice with the highest (posterior) probability of
having served as the median for each Term since 1937.
In what follows, we (1) introduce the Martin-Quinn method, (2)
explain why it represents an improvement over previous efforts, and
(3) offer two contemporary applications-both of which assess
emerging pieces of wisdom about the Court. that (a) the median
Justice (Sandra Day O'Connor) has moved to the "left" or, at least,
has grown more moderate in recent Terms, and (b) President
George W. Bush will be able to "remake" the Court.
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INTRODUCTION
The "center" of the Court;' the Court's "middle";2 the "swing"
Justice;3 the "pivotal" Justice;4 and the most "powerful" Justice.'
1. See, e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, The Positive Reality and Normative Virtues of
"Neutral" Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 533, 541 (2003) (noting that
"[a]lthough we are talking about the center of the Court, the center does seem to take
neutrality seriously in regard to deific recognition in schools"); Theodore W. Ruger et al.,
The Supreme Court Forecasting Project, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1155 (2004)
(describing their model's success "at predicting the important votes of the moderate
Justices (Kennedy and O'Connor) at the center of the current Court"); Alan B. Morrison,
The Rehnquist Choice, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1475 (2003) (reviewing JOHN W. DEAN,
THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT
REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001)) (claiming that "Justice Powell was ...
probably more in the center of the Court on some issues than it is likely that Nixon
expected").
2. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, October Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices,
Not Theory, Determine Constitutional Law, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 368 (2003) (claiming
that "at least until the composition of the Court changes, it is the value choices of the
middle of the current Court, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, that most often determine
the results"); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court's
Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 784 (2001) (stating that "Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Powell (usually in that order) were in the middle of the
Court"); Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1298,
1330 n.125 (2001) (reviewing J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: VOTING
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999)) (arguing that in
"the context of Shaw... [O'Connor is] squarely in the middle of the Rehnquist Court").
3. E.g., Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347, 349
(2003) (claiming that Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 982 (2001), "calls attention to how it is
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Legal commentators regularly invoke these terms to characterize the
Justice who is crucial to the outcome of a case and, thus, to the
establishment of public policy. Social scientists,6 though, tend to use
only one: the "median" Justice, that is, the Justice in the middle of a
distribution of Justices, such that (in an ideological distribution, for
example) half the Justices are to- the right of (more "conservative"
than) the median and half are to the left of (more "liberal" than) the
median.7
that the Supreme Court's identity is typically shaped by the Court's so-called swing
justices"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2201 (2002)
(suggesting that "swing Justices will see themselves and the Court as exposed to fewer
risks of shame or political retaliation if a broad array of interests supports a particular
result"); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1514
(2003) ("As in other areas of Supreme Court jurisprudence, two swing justices-Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor-have not yet firmly committed themselves to one
side or another of the debate.").
4. E.g., Tracey E. George, Developing-a Positive'Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1663 (1998) (writing that "Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has also been considered a pivotal Justice"); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 775, 787 (2003) ("It is credible to think
that one pivotal Justice, Owen Roberts, was convinced to shift his position on economic
due process because of the signals sent by Roosevelt's landslide reelection based in part on
his campaign against the Court."); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The
Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997) ("When these pivotal Justices
[O'Connor and Kennedy] are in their liberal mode, abortion restrictions, school prayer,
restrictions on gay rights, exclusion of women from VMI, and limitations on the right to
die fall victim to the Court's constitutional axe.").
5. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 1, at 1475 (claiming that "Justice Powell was ...
probably more in the center of the Court on some issues than it is likely that Nixon
expected"); Suzanna Sherry, RFRA-Vote Gambling, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 27, 29 (1997)
(taking note of a "recent game theoretic analysis of Supreme Court voting behavior over
the past two terms [showing] that Justice Kennedy is the most powerful Justice").
6. This is increasingly so in the law literature as well. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz,
Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior?, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1141 (2001)
(stating that in "the last quarter century, the shift in the median Justice has been from
Justice Powell or Justice Stewart to Justice Kennedy or Justice O'Connor"); Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul
Levmore, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 125, 141 (2002) (noting that "with the narrowest-
grounds rule in place, the median Justice can secure the holding without regard for any
strategic accommodation and thus he or she lacks an incentive to move to the right or left
of his or her preferred position"); Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in
Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78 IND. L.J. 47, 63 n.71 (2003) (noting that "[u]nder
some circumstances, the median Justice might become significantly closer to one of the
ideological poles"); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117
HARV. L. REV. 647, 680 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSITUTIONAL
ORDER (2003)) (asserting that "[a]fter 1962, Brennan was the Warren Court's median
Justice; the Rehnquist Court's is either O'Connor or Kennedy. When the median Justice
is Rehnquist or Scalia, then talk of revolution will be appropriate.").
7. For examples of the use of the median Justice in contemporary studies of the
Court, see supra note 6 and infra notes 11-13, 15; see also Paul Edelman & Jim Chen, The
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Why the idea of a "median" Justice dominates this literature is a
hardly a mystery: since publication of Duncan Black's seminal work8
we know that, under certain conditions, the outcome of a majority
vote will "pull" towards the position favored by the median. That is
because, as Black demonstrated, the median voter is essential to
secure a majority.9 In the context of judicial politics, this means that
the legal policy desired by the median Justice will (again, under
certain conditions and voting procedures) be the choice of the Court's
majority and, as such, the median can serve as an appropriate way to
characterize the preferences of "the Court" and the outcomes it
reaches.10
On this much virtually all social scientists-and an increasing
number of legal academics-agree; indeed, Black's "Median Voter
Theorem" now figures prominently and crucially in a wide array of
research on the Court, from studies of the nomination and
confirmation of Justices to their interactions with Congress12 and, of
course, to the Court's resolution of disputes.13 Where disagreement
Most Dangerous Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) for an effort to distinguish between
the median Justice and the "most powerful" or "most dangerous" Justice. But see Lynn
A. Baker's response, Comment: Interdisciplinary Due Diligence: The Case for Common
Sense in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187 (1996).
8. DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958);
Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948).
9. For more on this point, see infra Part I.
10. Part I, infra, more fully explains why this pull toward the median exists and, thus,
why the median can provide an appropriate way to characterize "the Court."
11. See generally Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing Presidents, Senators,
and Justice: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 477 (2001)
(proposing a unified scale for positioning the ideological preferences of presidents,
senators, and Supreme Court Justices); Byron J. Moraski & Charles R. Shipan, The
Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices,
43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1069 (1999) (proposing a statistical model that explains the strategic
nature of presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees).
12. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) (proposing a
model that envisions the Court, as well as Congress and the President, as a political actor
in the development and interpretation of civil rights legislation); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL.
SCi. REV. 28 (1997) (using models to argue that Supreme Court Justices tend to vote their
sincere preferences in rendering decisions, rather than deferring to their perceptions of
congressional preferences).
13. See generally Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 783 (2003) (describing quantitative approaches that political scientists have
taken to explain judicial decisionmaking); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial
Politics and Legal Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997) (using a multinomial logit model to find
that legal change is affected by the Supreme Court's political composition, legal




exists, however, is over how to identify the median. In some studies,
the authors seem to rely on their own "expert" judgment or intuitions
(though perhaps derived from loose analyses); 4 in others, scholars
invoke more rigorous approaches, such as the methodical inspection
of voting patterns in particular areas of the law. 5
Because these and other extant methods have their share of
problems,'16 we set out to develop a more compelling approach to
locate and identify the Court's median-what we call the Martin-
Quinn approach because it relies on methods developed by these two
scholars. 7 From this approach, we now have a systematic accounting
of the Justice with the highest (posterior) probability of having served
as the median for each Term of the Court since 1937.
In Parts III and IV, we introduce the Martin-Quinn approach,
explain why it represents an improvement over previous efforts and
offer two contemporary applications-both of which assess emerging
pieces of wisdom about the Court: that (1) the median Justice
(Sandra Day O'Connor) has moved to the "left" or, at least, grown
more moderate in recent Terms; and (2) President George W. Bush
will be able to "remake" the Court. We begin, though, with two
introductory notes. In the first (Part I), we consider Black's Median
Voter Theorem-the theorem that motivates the use of the median in
social science work on the Court. In the second (Part II), we describe
previous efforts by scholars of law and courts to identify the median
Justice and explain their relative advantages and drawbacks.
14. See generally Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in
American Society: Playing the Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 315
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (using rational choice theory to argue that Reconstruction-era
Court decisions reflect the Justices' strategic calculations about how the decisions will be
received by the political branches); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355 (1994) (modeling the Court's behavior in
enforcing the Constitution's federalist structure); Eskridge, supra note 12, at 641-64 (using
positive game theory to characterize interactions between the branches of government).
15. For a review of these more systematic approaches, see Lee Epstein & Carol
Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. ScI. 261 (1996). See also infra
Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III. For a technical description of their general project on ideal
point estimation (which employs Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to fit Bayesian
models) see generally Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10
POL. ANALYSIS 134, 137-40 (2002).
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I. THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
SUPREME COURT
In the contemporary study of judicial politics, it is difficult to
identify research that does not represent the Court on the basis of the
preferences of the "median Justice" or otherwise make use of that
concept. 8 This is as true of work on the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices, which suggests that both the President and the Senate
are attentive to the location of the Court's median when they make
their choices, 9 as it is of studies of the Court's interactions with
Congress20 and with the federal appellate courts,21 which typically
equate the preferences of the Court with that of its median member.
It also holds for research that seeks to unearth explanations for the
development of particular norms (such as the Rule of Four),22 as well
for formal doctrinal analyses.23
That the median plays such a crucial role in the modern study of
law and politics is a tribute to Duncan Black's work. In a now-
18. In light of the theme of this Symposium, we focus exclusively on the Supreme
Court of the United States, but studies of other tribunals, both here and abroad, also
invoke the logic of the Median Voter Theorem. See, e.g., Lori Hausegger & Stacia
Haynie, Judicial Decisionmaking and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court
and the South African Appellate Division, 37 L. & SOC'Y REV. 635, 655 (2003) (noting that
in these two countries, the policy preferences of nominees for chief justice are taken into
account in order to ensure that their supreme courts' "panel median" remains "closer to
the chief justice"); Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the
Bureaucracy: Federal Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service, 13
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 233, 245-55 (2002) (modeling the relationship between the
ideological bent of the federal judiciary and IRS audit behavior to argue that courts
provide some control over bureaucratic behavior); Eli Salzberger & Paul Fenn, Judicial
Independence: Some Evidence from the English Court of Appeal, 42 J.L. & ECON. 831,
842-43 (1999) (using the concept of the "median judge" to analyze the independence of
the English Court of Appeal).
19. See generally Moraski & Shipan, supra note 11.
20. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 12, at 615-17 (analyzing interactions between the
Court and Congress in the implementation of civil rights statutes).
21. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1509-11 (2003) (testing whether circuit court decisions can be
predicted by looking at the preferences of the Supreme Court, as measured in terms of the
median Justice's ideological position); Joseph L. Smith & Emerson H. Tiller, The Strategy
of Judging: Evidence from Administrative Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 75 n.36 (2002).
22. The so-called "Rule of Four" refers to the Supreme Court's policy requiring the
votes of only four Justices to support a grant of certiorari. Jeffrey R. Lax, Certiorari and
Compliance in the Judicial Hierarchy, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 61 (2003).
23. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1 (1998);
Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational
Choice and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431, 445-47 (1996) (applying a formula
to derive an "ideology index" for federal courts).
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landmark series of studies,24 Black demonstrated that, under certain
conditions, the policy desired by the median will be the choice of the
majority.25 Specifically, by his Median Voter Theorem, if voters (1)
have single-peaked preferences (2) in a single-dimensional issue
space,26 then the position of the median will prevail under majority
rule and various voting procedures.27
Let us unpack these ideas with reference to Figure 1, which
illustrates the preferences of three Justices (but which generalizes to a
Court of nine) over a specific policy matter: the standard (or test) to
apply in constitutional sex discrimination cases (but which could be
virtually any particular policy area). Notice that the issue space
conforms to one condition of the Median Voter Theorem: it is a
single line-a continuum, really, with policy positions on the left
(more "liberal") representing higher barriers that the government
must overcome to defend its sex-based classifications and those on
the right (more "conservative") representing lower barriers.28 Note
too that the Justices' preferences conform to the single-peakedness
condition: each has a maximum at some point on the line-their
"most preferred position" or "ideal point"-and "slopes" away from
that maximum on either side. For example, in the case of Justice 2,
her most preferred position, as indicated by the top of her curve, is
the rather centrist position (at least here) of skeptical scrutiny; her
preferences decline for alternatives to her left (strict scrutiny) and to
24. See generally BLACK, supra note 8 passim.
25. See, e.g., Black, supra note 8, at 28 ("No matter in what manner the preference
curves or optimums of the other members alter or move about, if it is given that one
optimum remains the median optimum, the decision of the committee must remain
fixed.").
26. Nearly all statistical work on the United States Supreme Court suggests that the
issue space is single-dimensional. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy Brazill,
Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court through Multidimensional Scaling:
Analysis of "Natural Court" 1953-1991, 112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58 (2002) (noting that the
single dimension solution explains much of the Justices' voting behaviors).
27. For accessible expositions of the theorem, see SHAUN HARGREAVES HEAP ET
AL., THE THEORY OF CHOICE: A CRITICAL GUIDE 219-22 (1992); DENNIS C. MUELLER,
PUBLIC CHOICE II 65-66 (1989); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK,
ANALYZING POLITICS 84 (1997); Roger D. Congleton, The Median Voter Model, in 2 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 382 (C. K. Rowley and F. Schneide ed., 2004). Our
discussion here derives from these sources, as well as from EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note
23, and Epstein et al., supra note 13.
28. We identify just three possibilities: strict scrutiny, skeptical scrutiny, and
heightened scrutiny. But others, both to the right of heightened and the left of strict, exist.
See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Does the U.S. Constitution Need an ERA? 4-6 (2004), at
http://epstein.wustl.edu/ research/ERA.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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her right (heightened scrutiny).29
Figure 1
Justice 2 Justice 3
ml
FPrem: Will Craig,
Stict Scrutiny Skeptical (Nearly Stric) Scrutiy Hightened Sanfirny
Equal Prntection Standards ine Sex Discriminatlion Cases
The median voter prevails in the decision over the standard to apply in
constitutional sex discrimination cases. 
3 0
In this depiction, Justice 2 is also the median voter: the same
number of Justices prefer a lower standard than Justice 2 as the
29. The condition of single-peakedness would be violated if a Justice were an
"extremist" in the sense that she preferred either a low level of scrutiny or a high level of
scrutiny to the more centrist skeptical scrutiny.
30. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality of the Court concluded
"that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race . .. are inherently
suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id. at 682. In Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court articulated the heightened scrutiny standard: "To
withstand constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Id. at 198. Finally, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996
[hereinafter VMI case]. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, attempted to "ratchet
up" Craig, stating that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action. Today's
skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds
to volumes of history." Id. at 531. Ginsburg's language in the VMI case can be traced
back to Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) and J. E.R. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 (1994). For example Peter Smith asserts "in
recent gender discrimination challenges, the Court has applied a super-heightened
scrutiny to equal protection challenges. The language for this redefinition of intermediate
review derives from Hogan," which required that gender-based governmental action
demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification. Peter Smith, The Demise of Three-
Tier Review, 23 J. CONTEmp. L. 475,477 n.17 (1997). Smith also cites J.E.B. Id.
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number that prefer a higher standard than Justice 2 (one each).3
And, as such, the Median Voter Theorem tells us that the point
corresponding to Justice 2's most preferred position (or ideal point)-
skeptical scrutiny-will prevail in a majority vote; that point is an
"equilibrium," meaning here that it will defeat any other point under
a majority voting regime.32
Why? If we assume single-peakedness, Justices 2 and 3 always
will oppose any standard to left of skeptical scrutiny and Justices 1
and 2 always will oppose any standard to the right of skeptical
scrutiny. So, for example, suppose the choice is between the
alternatives of strict versus skeptical scrutiny:
Justice 1 votes for strict; Justice 2 votes for skeptical, as does
Justice 3-with skeptical a 2-1 vote winner.
If the alternatives are skeptical versus heightened scrutiny, then
skeptical again prevails:
Justice 1 votes for skeptical as does Justice 2, while Justice 3
selects heightened scrutiny.
Notice that in the first instance, the outcome represents a defeat for
Justice 1 and, in the second, Justice 3 fails, but, that in both, Justice 2
is on the winning side.33
II. EXISTING METHODS FOR IDENTIFYING THE MEDIAN JUSTICE
From even this brief discussion, it is easy to see why virtually all
contemporary literature on judicial decisionmaking relies so heavily
on the concept of the median. If we believe, as so many scholars do,34
that preferences-particularly policy preferences-play a crucial role
in explaining the choices the Court makes, then we require a method
31. We adapt this example from Congleton, supra note 27, at 382, and Keith Krehbiel,
Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 259, 260-69 (1988).
32. The median need not be unique. Indeed, with an even number of Justices, the
median is actually the range of points between the two most central Justices. This is
because any of these points constitutes an equilibrium.
33. We also should note that the median need not be located exactly between the
highest standard and the lowest. As HEAP ET AL., supra note 27, at 221, note "[t]he
median is identified by reference to the relation between his or her preferences and the
preferences of all other voters, and not by reference to the underlying terms in which the
ideological space is defined." What this means is that if the Court is rather conservative
(such that some Justices prefer a rational basis standard, which would be to the right of
intermediate scrutiny) then the median might prefer heightened scrutiny.
34. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 23, at 57; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 44-85
(2002); Ruger et al., supra note 1, at 1157-58.
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to account for those preferences. Enter the Median Voter Theorem:
if it holds for the Court, then it suggests that the preferences of the
median Justice ought to provide a meaningful representation of the
preferences of "the Court."35
At the very least, this is how judicial specialists have made use of
the theorem's logic. Illustrative is recent research by Epstein et al.,
which sought to determine whether the United States Supreme Court
curtails rights and liberties during wars and other threats to the
nation's security.36  Conducting the investigation required the
researchers to take into account whether an international crisis was
ongoing when the Court made its decision; that was the variable of
primary interest. But, in light of a vast social science literature
indicating the existence of a political component to judicial
decisionmaking-such that liberal Justices, regardless of a war, are
more likely to support litigants alleging a violation of their rights by
the government and conservatives Justices are more likely to support
the government-Epstein and her.colleagues also needed to attend to
the political preferences of "the Court" over matters of rights and
liberties.' To do so, they included a variable called "the Court," but
which was, in fact, the political preferences of the median Justice.
35. Some law scholars have taken issue with the conditions of Black's theorem.
Edelman & Chen, supra note 7, at 231, for example, assert that "it verges -on the
unsporting to name a multidimensional controversy," though they name one. And Evan
H. Caminker writes that:
It is frequently assumed that ... the majority will converge in a moderate or
median position. This may well be quite likely when the Justices' ideal points can
be lined up nicely in a single-peaked fashion along a single dimension, for in stance
from liberal to conservative .... But sometimes the options under discussion
cannot easily be aligned along a single dimension.
Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2297, 2320 (1999). We too can identify particular cases that violate the condition
of a single-dimension issue space but, as it turns out, the great majority of disputes before
the Supreme Court do not. For example, of the 8,889 cases in which the Court heard oral
arguments and decided between the 1953 and 2002 terms, only 3.79 percent (n=337)
contained more than one issue (e.g., a case that raised questions about federal taxation
and federalism). See Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Database, May 17,
2004 release, at http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerprojectfUlmerProject/sctdata.htm
(calculating the prior percentage using the following values: analu=4; dec type=1,6, or 7)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Grofman & Brazill, supra note 26,
at 55 (using multidimensional analysis scaling to estimate the policy preference of the
Justices).
36. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-
War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2005).
37. This literature is indeed vast. For the canonical example, see SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 34, at 115-74.
THE MEDIAN JUSTICE
The task confronting Epstein et al.-not to mention virtually all
researchers investigating judicial decisionmaking-was how to locate
the median's ideal point. To accomplish it, she and her colleagues
relied on expert judgments. But two other methods were possible:
the use of party affiliations and votes. In what follows we consider all
three.
A. Party Affiliations
The use of political party to identify the median Justice comes in
many variants. Some analysts rely primarily on the party of the
Justice, others on the party of the appointing President or Senate, and
still a third group on a combination of two or more of these factors.
Spitzer and Cohen's work exemplifies the latter.38 To locate the
policy preferences of the Court's median, they assigned a score
(ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 being the most conservative) to each
Justice serving between 1977 and 1992 based on the political party of
the appointing Senate and President. 9 We display the results of their
calculations for the 1977 Term in Table 1 but the year we selected
matters not: the median was a relatively conservative .70 for all the
years in their study.n
38. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 23, 431.
39. See id. at 445-47. Their score gives greater weight to the President when the
Senate is of the opposing political party. For more details, see id.
40. See id. As Spitzer and Cohen explain it, "[t]he median is .7 [for 1977]. In 1981
O'Connor (with a value of 1.0) replaced Stewart, making the median .7 .... In 1986 Scalia
(1.0) replaced Burger, leaving the median at .7 .... In 1988 Kennedy (.7) replaced Powell,
leaving the median ... unchanged. In 1990 Souter (.7) replaced Brennan, leaving the
median.., unchanged." Id. at 447 n.38.
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Table 1
Justice Spitzer-Cohen Actual Liberal










Using party affiliation to identify the location of the median Justice, 1977. An
asterisk "*" indicates the median Justice in 1977. The Spitzer-Cohen column
shows the Spitzer-Cohen political preference score, which is based on the party
affiliation of the appointing President and Senate. The Actual Liberal Voting
column shows the proportion of liberal votes cast in 1977 in civil liberties cases.
4
1
The relative ease of developing a Spitzer-Cohen-type approach
makes it attractive: data on the party affiliations of Justices,
Presidents, and Senates are available from any number of sources.
42
But this approach's downsides are considerable. First, as Spitzer and
Cohen themselves recognize, ideological "mistakes" abound .4  That
is because the appointing President, Senate, or both can and do make
them; Eisenhower admitted as much about two of his nominees,
Brennan and Warren, who-much to his chagrin-turned out to be a
good deal more liberal than he anticipated.'
Surely, this problem afflicts the Spitzer-Cohen method, which
classifies both Brennan and Rehnquist as medians when, based on
their actual voting records, they are the maximums and minimums (or
41. See id. (reporting the Cohen & Spitzer scores); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 491-523 tbl. 6-3 (2002) (reporting the proportion of
liberal votes cast).
42. For an electronic, analyzable source that contains information about the party and
ideology of Justices, Presidents, and Senators, see the United States Supreme Court
Justices Database, which is available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/justicesdata.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
43. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 23, at 447 n.38.
44. Specifically, when asked if he made any mistakes as President, President
Eisenhower replied "[yjes, two, and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court." See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 51 (1985).
THE MEDIAN JUSTICE
nearly so).45 But a second, albeit related, downside may be even more
serious: the Spitzer-Cohen measure assumes that all Democrats are
equivalently liberal and all Republicans are equivalently conservative,
when plainly this is not always the case. Presidents of the same
political party vary in their ideological preferences; "Eisenhower is
not Reagan."46  Nor, might we add, is Senator Ted Kennedy the
ideological equivalent of Senator Joe Lieberman even though they
are both Democrats; likewise, Justice Stevens is not Chief Justice
Rehnquist even though they are both Republicans.
Because party-based approaches to the median can miss these in-
group distinctions, they are prone to errors. On most, for example,
the median would not have budged when the Nixon appointee,
Warren Burger, replaced the Eisenhower appointee, Earl Warren:
both Presidents were Republicans, as were their appointees. Based
on the observed proportion of liberal votes cast, however, the
location of the median did, in fact, change: in the area of civil
liberties, for example, it moved considerably-from a liberal score of
.771 (Fortas) to .504 (White/Black).47
Of course this decrease in liberalism would hardly surprise
students of politics: by most measures, Nixon was more conservative
than Eisenhower48 and Burger was more conservative than Warren.49
But it is not an alteration that a blunt indicator, such as party
affiliation, is particularly able to detect.
B. "Expert Judgments": The Segal- Cover Scores
The use of expert judgments to identify the median Justice is a
relatively new approach. It was developed by political scientists
Jeffrey A. Segal and Albert D. Cover, who analyzed the content of
45. See Table 1.
46. Workshop on Empirical Research in the Law, On Tournaments for Appointing
Great Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 157, 176 (2004) ("Indeed, the
empirical record demonstrates that the voting propensities of some Democratic and
Republican Presidents do not differ significantly.") (citing Michael W. Giles et al., Picking
Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisian Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RESEARCH Q.
623, 624 (2001)).
47. See also Table 4 (showing that the median moved from Thurgood Marshall (a very
liberal -0.781) in the 1968 term to Hugo Black (0.187) in 1969).
48. See, e.g., Keith Poole, Nominate Data: Common Space Coordinates for U.S.
Presidents, at http://voteview.uh.edu/defaultnomdata.htm (last visited June 25, 2004)
(reporting a score of 0.169 for Eisenhower and 0.369 for Nixon (higher scores are more
conservative)) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
49. For example, 78.6% of Warren's 771 votes in civil liberties cases were in the
liberal direction; that figure for Burger is 29.6% (N=1,429). Data are from EPSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 41, tbl. 6-2. See also Figure 2.
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newspaper editorials written between the time of a Justice's
nomination to the Court and confirmation to the bench. ° Segal and
Cover then translated their "expert judgments" (i.e., newspaper
editors' assessments) into ideological values or scores, which range
from -1 (unanimously conservative) to 0 (moderate) to +1
(unanimously liberal)." In Figure 2 we display these "Segal-Cover"
scores for each Justice appointed since 1937;52 and in Figure 3 we
depict the scores of utmost concern here: those for the median
Justice for the 1946 through 2003 Terms. 3
50. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 557 (1989). Segal and Cover made use of
editorials in four of the nation's leading newspapers, two with a liberal outlook (the New
York Times and the Washington Post) and two on the more conservative end (the Chicago
Tribune and the Los Angeles Times). Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995), updated the Segal-
Cover scores to cover the four most recent nominees (Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) and backdated the scores to include Justices appointed since 1937 (Hugo Black).
51. As Segal and Cover explain their procedures:
We trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial] for political
ideology. Paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate, conservative, or not
applicable. Liberal statements include (but are not limited to) those ascribing
support for the rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial minorities
in equality cases, and the individual against the government in privacy and First
Amendment cases. Conservative statements are those with an opposite direction.
Moderate statements include those that explicitly ascribe moderation to the
nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative values.
Segal & Cover, supra note 50, at 559 (emphasis omitted). They arrived at their measure
by subtracting the fraction of paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of
paragraphs coded liberal and dividing by the total number of paragraphs coded liberal,
conservative, and moderate.
52. For a complete list of the Segal-Cover scores, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41,
tbl. 6-1.
53. We begin with the 1946 term because that it is the first one for which Segal-Cover
scores are available for all sitting Justices. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, tbl. 6-1.
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The Segal-Cover scores for Justices appointed since 1937 (Hugo L. Black through
Stephen G. Breyer). The scores range from -1.00 (most conservative) to 1.00
(most liberal).54
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The median of the Segal-Cover scores, 1946-2003 Terms. The line depicts the
Segal-Cover score of the median Justice for each term. The scores range from
-1.00 (most conservative) to 1.00 (most liberal).55
54. The Segal-Cover scores are available in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, tbl. 6-1.
55. The median of the Segal-Cover scores for each term is available in EPSTEIN ET
AL., supra note 41, tbl. 3-12.
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From these illustrations, we can see why many scholars employ
these scores: to the extent that they are well in line with commonly
held intuitions about particular Justices and Court eras, they appear
facially valid. For example, Brennan and Marshall, generally
regarded as liberals, receive scores of 1.00; Scalia and Rehnquist,
generally regarded as conservatives, receive scores of -1.00 and -0.91,
respectively. The median Justice data also comport with scholarly
impressions of particular Court eras: note the high level of liberalism
during the Warren Court years (1953-1968 Terms) and the decrease
that occurs thereafter as more and more Justices appointed by
conservative Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and
George H.W. Bush ascended to the bench. 6
The assets of the Segal-Cover scores do not stop here. Yet
another-and one that provides their clear competitive advantage-is
this: because Segal and Cover generated them from an inspection of
newspaper editorials prior to the Justices' confirmation, and not from
decisions rendered upon their ascension to the bench, the scores are
exogenous to the judicial vote. This means that scholars can employ
them as a measure of the median Justice's preferences in their studies
without running the risk of circularity (i.e., using votes [to locate the
median] to predict votes). Of course, invoking the scores in this way
would not be particularly beneficial if they failed miserably at
explaining judicial output, but that is not the case: statistical analyses
demonstrate they are acceptable predictors of votes in many (but not
all)57 areas of the law, for many Justices; they also are able to capture
the median voter in many (though again not all) Terms, which in turn,
can supply a (relatively) useful predictor of Court outcomes. 8
56. For ideological characterizations of particular Court eras, see generally HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOuIS
U. L.J. 569 (2003).
57. We return to this point momentarily.
58. For example, a simple bivariate regression of the percentage of civil liberties cases
decided in the liberal direction and the median of the Segal-Cover scores produces the
following.
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)







These advantages-and they are considerable-explain why
Epstein and her colleagues, in their research on the effect of war on
judicial decisions, relied on the Segal-Cover scores and not party
affiliation to identify the ideal point of "the Court" (i.e., the median
Justice).5 9 Unfortunately, disadvantages exist as well. One is that
while the Segal-Cover scores provide a reasonable measure of the
median for research focusing on civil liberties (e.g., the Epstein war
study),' they hold little explanatory power for analyses of litigation
involving unions, federalism, and taxation-or about fifteen percent
of the Court's plenary docket.61 This is hardly a surprise since Segal
and Cover, recall, developed their measure from newspaper editorial
writers-a group of "experts" who may very well be inclined to
evaluate a judicial candidate's ideological leaning on the basis of a
few "splashy" civil liberties issues rather than on the range of issues
potentially facing the new Justice. But it is a real disadvantage for
research requiring a measure of the median in the range of disputes
before the Court.
A second drawback is that we cannot, from the Segal-Cover
scores (or, for that matter, party affiliation), quantify the degree of
uncertainty about the location of the median. In other words, Segal
and Cover treat the median as unambiguously "the median" even
though we have an intuition that this is not always the case. Indeed,
without O'Connor's presence on the Court today, we doubt that this
Symposium, specifically on the Court's "center," would have the
cachet that it does: on virtually all conceptual and empirical
definitions, O'Connor is the Court's center-the median, the key, the
critical, and the swing Justice.62 But would we say the same about
Thurgood Marshall in 1968, Harry Blackmun in the late 1970s, and
David Souter in the early 1990s? Each was, in fact, very likely the
Court's median, but none was as unambiguously so as O'Connor.63
The ability to quantify this degree of ambiguousness-in the form of
a probability-is thus a crucial task, but one that neither the Segal-
Cover scores nor approaches based on party affiliation are capable of
assuming.
The median of the Segal-Cover scores are available in EPSTEIN ET AL, supra note 41, tbl.
3-12; data on civil liberties cases are in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, tbl. 3-8.
59. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41.
60. See supra note 36.
61. See Epstein & Mershon, supra note 15, at 278. For data on the Court's plenary
docket, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 41, at 80-85, tbl. 2-11.
62. See infra note 80. Interestingly, an exception here is the Segal-Cover approach,
which categorizes Souter, not O'Connor, as the median.
63. See Figure 5.
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C. Votes
There is yet one other method for identifying the Court's
median, and it may be the most common: analyses of votes cast by
the Justices.' One reason for the appeal of this approach is that it is
relatively easy to deploy. All the researcher needs do is select an area
of the law-say, criminal procedure or an even finer one, such as
Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases-and inspect the
behavior of individual Justices in a given Term(s), Term t, with an eye
toward characterizing the median in that term or in a subsequent one,
Term t + 1.
That inspection could take several forms; here, we emphasize
two. In the first, illustrated in Figure 4 (the PV[term] line), we (1)
examine the percentage of votes cast by the Justices in favor of
criminal defendants (that is, the percentage of "liberal" votes) in
three Terms (1961, 1981, and 2001) and then (2) array the Justices on
the single issue dimension of criminal procedure, which ranges from
most favorable to defendants (most liberal) to least favorable (most
conservative). The Justice in the middle is the median for that Term
(e.g., Justice White in the 1981 Term).
64. More accurately, vote analysis encompasses diverse sets of methods, from the
simple counting of "liberal" and "conservative" votes in various issue areas to
sophisticated latent variable models. Compare Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296-314 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995), with Martin & Quinn, supra
note 17, 137-40. For a review of literature relying on some of these methods, see Epstein
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The median Justice in criminal procedure cases, 1962, 1983, and 2002 Terms. The
figure in parentheses under the Justice's name is the percentage of votes cast in
favor of the defendant (liberal votes). The PV[termj line arrays the Justices
based on their percent liberal voting in criminal procedure cases in the prior
Term. For example, for the 1962 Term, the PV61 line shows the Justices arrayed
based on their voting in the 1961 Term, such that Clark cast 35.3% of his votes in
favor of defendants, Stewart cast 52.9%, and so on. The actual line arrays Justices
based on their percent liberal voting in criminal procedure in that term. For
example, for the 1962 Term, the Actual line shows the Justices arrayed based on
their voting in the 1962 Term. Note that Whittaker departed from the Court (and
White arrived) before the end of the 1961 Term, and that Frankfurter
participated in only seven of the seventeen criminal procedure cases decided
during that Term. We include them here for purposes of discussion.
65
In the second example, shown in Table 2, we reproduce Segal's
cumulative scale of Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases
resolved by the Justices between the 1975 and 1980 Terms (a period
of stability in the Court's membership). 66 From even a visual
inspection of this scale-which is simply an ordering of cases based on
65. We derived these data from Spaeth, supra note 35, passim.
66. Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Human Decision Makers: An
Individual-Level Analysis of the Search and Seizure Cases, 48 J. POL. 938, 943 (1986).
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the number of "+" votes (those cast in support of the defendant) and
of the Justices based on the number of "+" votes they cast-we could
reach a number of conclusions but only one is relevant here: Justice
White once again emerges as the median. He sits in the middle of the
array across the top; we also can observe that (with a few "errors"
here and there) the cases tend to break around him: when he votes in
favor of the defendant, the outcome tends to favor the defendant and
when he votes against the defendant, the outcomes tend to go against
the defendant. Finally, as Segal explains, "[o]f the 37 cases scaled in
[the figure] ... White provided the minimum winning vote 24 times,











































Cumulative scale of non-unanimous search and seizure decisions, 1975-1980
Terms. A "+" indicates a vote in favor the defendant (the search was
unreasonable); a "-" indicates a vote in favor of the government (the search was
reasonable); and a "NP" indicates that the Justice did not participate in the
case.
68
Segal's examination of voting patterns, not to mention ours in
Figure 4, shores up the advantages of this approach: it is, as we noted
earlier, relatively straightforward to deploy and is capable of
unearthing the median for a given Term(s). Moreover, it can provide
valuable fodder for research, as the Segal study itself demonstrates.
After identifying White as the median voter in search and seizure
cases, Segal explored possible explanations for the decisions of this
key Justice. From this analysis we learn, among other lessons, that
White treated "searches involving the United States more leniently
than cases involving the various states .... A state search having a
fifty-two percent chance of being upheld by White would have a
probability of .74 of being upheld if it were a federal search."69
On the other hand, invoking votes to locate the median is hardly
without drawbacks. Primarily, while we have no qualms with the
Segal study, we and most other social scientists would certainly take
issue with research that invoked the median (to represent "Court") in
Term t to explain Court decisions in Term t: that would amount to
using votes to predict votes.70
And therein lies the rub: if we cannot employ votes in this way,
then they are of little value for many research projects-actually, for
any project that seeks to explain judicial outcomes. So, for example,
while their study of decisionmaking during times of war required
them to include a variable representing the Court's preferences,
Epstein and her colleagues rejected as utterly circular the use of the
median's percentage liberal score in, say, the 1962, 1982, and 2002
68. This scale is from Segal, supra note 66, at 943.
69. Id. at 946.
70. Technically, this means that the independent and dependent variables are
identical: votes and votes. For more on this problem in research on the Court, see SEGAL
& SPAETH, supra note 34, at 312-54; Epstein & Mershon, supra note 15, at 263.
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Terms to explain voting in the 1962, 1982, and 2002 Terms. (They
employed instead, as we noted earlier, the Segal-Cover scores.)
Of course, this same problem does not afflict research that relies
on median votes in Term t -1 to account for Court decisions in Term t
(that is, the use of past votes to explain current behavior). Numerous
studies in fact take this approach and for a good reason: the past
turns out to be a satisfactory predictor of the future. Epstein and
Mershon, for example, demonstrate that using past (one-year lagged)
votes to locate the Justices along a policy scale in a given Term yields
fairly accurate results (that is, significant Spearman rank-order
correlations) for the subsequent Term, for all the Terms in their study
(1953-1991).71 Likewise, they find that Court voting in Term t -1
explains (to a statistically significant degree) voting in Term t in all
the legal areas they examined (criminal procedure, civil rights, First
Amendment, economics, and judicial power).72
Our analysis too provides some support for this approach.
Return to Figure 4 and note that if we relied on the median voter in
the 1981 Term (White) to characterize Court preferences in the 1982
Term, we would have selected the "right" Justice: White was once
again the median. But notice the problem that emerges if we were
studying the 1962 Term: the median in the 1961 Term, Whittaker,
actually retired midway through the Term; and Frankfurter left in
August of 1962. Two new Justices joined the Court, Goldberg and
White, making any a priori determination of the median's preferences
in 1962-at least using past votes-nearly impossible.
III. OUR APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING THE MEDIAN
Other problems with a reliance on votes (past or current) would
be easy enough to summon. For example, even if we could correctly
anticipate the median for the 1962 Term, we could not employ the
data in Figure 4, which centers on criminal procedure, to study
decisions involving, say, labor-management disputes; we would need
to create a different array-a tedious process for the researcher
analyzing a number of distinct legal areas. But further discussion of
this and other drawbacks would only serve to underscore the larger
point: all existing methods to identifying and locating the median
have their share of problems, and these are hardly marginal problems.
That is why we set out to develop a new and, we hope, more
71. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 15, at 274.
72. Id. at 275, 278; see also Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court and Criminal Justice




Our approach (hereinafter the "Martin-Quinn" approach or
method) is distinct from all those we have thus far discussed in that:
(1) we base it on a spatial model of voting on the Court, which (2) we
in turn use to derive a probability model in which the votes of the
Justices are the dependent variables.73 As such, our method provides
a logically coherent approach to estimate directly the quantities of
interest (the ideological location and identity of the median Justice)
that also enjoys good statistical properties as long as some mild side
conditions are met.
The spatial model that motivates the Martin-Quinn approach
assumes that Justices have a choice between two alternatives.74 These
alternatives have policy consequences that we can represent by points
in an issue space. Justices evaluate these policy consequences with
utility functions that are single-peaked around some ideal policy point
specific to each Justice. A (trivial) consequence of the model is that a
Justice is most likely to vote for the alternative that is closest to her in
the policy space.
The probability model that we derive from this theoretical model
of spatial voting is a means of accounting for variability in the votes of
Justices in relatively parsimonious terms. More important for the
purposes of this Article, it provides a framework that analysts can use
to make principled statements about the location and identity of the
median Justice on the Court.
The central building block for the probability model is that the
probability of Justice j voting for the alternative coded 1" in case k is
73. While Grofman and Brazill's approach also is a method of uncovering an
ideological scale from observed votes, it is not directly linked to a theoretical model of
voting. See Grofman & Brazill, supra note 26, at 58. Further, because their method does
not make use of an explicit probability model the researchers are unable to make
statements about the uncertainty attached to their measures.
74. For more on this point see infra note 75.
75. As we note in the text, the model assumes that the Justices' votes can be treated as
dichotomous (i.e., 0/1) variables with possible missing values. The coding rule for this
dichotomization is not important as long as it is consistent across Justices within a
particular case. We use an "affirm"/"reverse" dichotomy but other coding schemes would
produce identical results. All that is necessary is that the votes of the Justices be coded
consistently within a particular case. In other words, it is perfectly satisfactory to code
votes on some cases as "with the majority"/"not with the majority" and votes on another
subset of cases as "with the Chief Justice"/"not with the Chief Justice," and so on. All
such codings will produce identical results. The reason for this, as we develop in the text,
is that the parameter flk that appears in the expression for the vote probabilities is a free
parameter that can take either positive or negative values. A positive fik implies that
rightward movement of an ideal point will make the Justice more likely to vote in the
direction coded as "1" for case k while a negative fk will imply the opposite. Since each
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given by:
4)(ak + 0k0)
where (D(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, ak
and f6k are deterministic functions of the policy locations of the two
alternatives, and 0. is the ideological location of Justice j's most
preferred policy (her ideal point).76 Because of the dichotomous
nature of each Justice's decision, the probability that Justice j votes
for the alternative coded 0 in case k is given by:
1 - 0(a + fl,0J)
The mathematics involved here follow directly from the
theoretical model of voting and are just a representation of the fact
that, under the theoretical model, Justice j will most likely vote for
the option generating the policy consequences she most prefers.
Martin and Quinn have analyzed this model from a Bayesian
perspective, which is simply a means of rationally learning about the
probable values of the model parameters. As a practical matter, this
is very similar to finding the values ak, flk, and 0. for all cases and
Justices that were most likely to have generated the observed votes
(i.e., classical maximum likelihood estimation). A subtle (but, for this
Article, important) difference between Bayesian inference and
classical likelihood inference is that Bayesian inference involves
summarizing the joint probability distribution of all model parameters
given the observed data, whereas classical inference involves the use
of an estimator to pick a unique estimate of the model parameters
along with an assessment of how this estimator would behave if new
data samples were taken from the population of interest. The reason
this is important here is that once the joint probability distribution of
all the Justices' ideal points is known, calculating probability
distributions for the location of the median Justice, the identity of the
median Justice, and any other function of the ideal points is little
case has a distinct fPk the coding of votes needs only to be consistent across Justices within
each case. Indeed, inspecting the sign of the estimated flks provides a principled means to
test the accuracy of subjective "liberal" / "conservative" codings of votes. See generally
Joseph Bafumi et al., Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal
Point Estimation (2004) (discussing ideal point estimation), available at
http://polmeth.wustl.edu/retrieve.php?id=27 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
76. The full Martin-Quinn model is slightly more complicated due to issues of




more than an exercise in counting.77
To see why, consider the following stylized example involving
three Justices in a single-dimensional issue space. Using the rules of
Bayesian inference we can calculate the joint probability distribution
of the three ideal points given the observed voting data. Call the
three ideal points 01, 0, and 03, With knowledge of the joint
distribution of the ideal points we can take a random sample of 01, 0,
and 03 from this distribution. In practice we would want to take a
very large random sample, but for the sake of illustration we assume a
sample of size ten. Table 3 displays this hypothetical sample, with
each row representing one draw from the joint probability













Hypothetical sample from joint distribution of ideal points for a three Justice
example.
With this sample in hand we can estimate the quantities that are
of direct interest to us-the location and identify of the median
Justice. Take first the location of the median Justice. The
distribution of this quantity is simply that of the median element of
(0, 02, 03) from each row. In this example, this is (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.6, 0.9,
0.7, 1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 1.0). The expected location of the median is just the
mean of this distribution, which is (0.7+0.8+0.9+0.6+0.9+0.7+
77. In contrast, even when analysts calculate appropriate measures of estimation
uncertainty for classical estimates (which is rare in the scaling literature), the resulting
point estimates and standard errors do not enable them to make statements about the
probability that a particular Justice is the median or about the location of the median in a
particular term.
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1.0+0.9+0.8+1.0)/10 = 0.83. To find the identity of the median Justice,
we estimate the probability that Justice j (for all j) is the median of
the Court. We do this by calculating the fraction of the draws for
which 0. is the median. From this exercise, we learn that
approximately a sixty percent chance exists that Justice 1 is the
median, a forty percent chance that Justice 2 is the median, and less
than a ten percent chance that Justice 3 is the median. We can make
all these estimates arbitrarily precise by increasing the size of the
random sample from the distribution of ideal points.
A. Results from the Martin-Quinn Approach
With our method now noted, let us turn to the basic results it
yields. We begin, in Figure 5, with the Martin-Quinn estimates of the
location of the median Justice in each Term from 1937-2002. The
black (dotted) line indicates the location, such that the higher
(positive) the number, the more conservative the median and the
lower (negative) the number, the more liberal. As points of
reference, we also plot (using the gray vertical lines) the range
spanned by the most liberal and most conservative Justice in each
term. So, for example, in the first Term depicted, 1937, the median
Justice (Charles Evans Hughes) is a relatively moderate -0.434; the
most conservative (James McReynolds) is 2.813; and the most liberal
(Hugo Black) is -2.852. In the last Term we show (2002), Sandra Day
O'Connor is the median (0.247); Clarence Thomas is the most
conservative (3.637); and John Paul Stevens is the most liberal
(-2.516).
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Figure 5
1940 190 1960 1970 1980 199 2000
Term
Estimated posterior distribution of the location of the median Justice for the
dynamic ideal point model, 1937-2002. The y-axis is the estimated ideal point
scale (from liberal to conservative); the x-axis denotes the Term. The black
(dotted) line indicates the location of the median, such that the higher (positive)
the number, the more conservative the median and the lower (negative) the
number, the more liberal. The gray (vertical) lines for each Term represent the
estimated location of the most liberal and conservative Justice each Term.
From this figure flow a number of interesting findings. Since we
bring several to light in Part IV, let us for now simply point to one:
the location of the median fluctuates considerably over time-even
during periods of stability in Court membership (or what social
scientists call "natural courts").78 Consider, for example, the period
between the 1994 and 2002 Terms. While no Justices joined or
retired during these Terms, the median ranged from a high of 0.711
(O'Connor) to a low (liberal) of 0.247 (O'Connor). This result, as we
highlight later, supports speculation that the Rehnquist Court median
has begun to drift slightly to the left; on the other hand, it may call
78. See, e.g., Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court: A
Reexamination, 24 AM. J. POL. Sci. 526, 528 (1980) ("A natural court is a court in which
only a given nine Justices sit."); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court
Justices' Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 724-25, n.9 (2000) ("[A] natural court
persists until its composition is changed. That is, when a new Justice is appointed to
replace an incumbent, a new natural court begins."); David M. O'Brien, Charting the
Rehnquist Court's Course: How the Center Folds, Holds, and Shifts, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 981, 981 n.5 (1996) ("Political scientists generally analyze the Supreme Court in
terms of 'natural courts,' periods in which the Court's personnel remain stable.").
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into question analyses and methods (including the Segal-Cover
scores) that assume little, if any, change in the median's ideology
during natural court periods.
These observations follow from our estimates of the location of
the median. We also can invoke the Martin-Quinn method to
calculate the probability that a particular Justice was the median in a
particular Term. We report this information in Table 4 for the Justice
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1964 -0.525 0.579 Goldberg 0.706
1965 -0.566 0.594 Black 0.895
1966 -0.296 0.610 Black 0.993
1967 -0.841 0.626 Marshall 0.625
1968 -0.781 0.637 Marshall 0.334
1969 0.187 0.652 Black 0.494
1970 0.484 0.660 Harlan 0.446
1971 0.765 0.671 White 1.000
1972 1.026 0.698 White 0.907
1973 0.625 0.715 White 0.615
1974 0.609 0.729 White 0.883
1975 0.580 0.206 Stewart 0.516
1976 0.477 0.218 Stewart 0.673
1977 0.226 0.223 Blackmun 0.560
1978 0.111 0.223 Blackmun 0.893
1979 0.147 0.260 White 0.938
1980 0.075 0.284 White 0.945
1981 0.022 0.298 White 0.981
1982 0.461 0.307 White 1.000
1983 0.728 0.320 White 0.879
1984 0.656 0.331 Powell 0.945
1985 0.773 0.337 Powell 0.982
1986 0.741 0.343 Powell 0.995
1987 0.907 0.357 White 0.795
1988 1.004 0.380 White 0.959
1989 0.779 0.412 White 0.997
1990 0.872 0.493 Souter 0.479
1991 0.618 0.208 Souter 0.343
1992 0.683 0.235 O'Connor 0.680
1993 0.695 0.255 Kennedy 0.770
1994 0.580 0.264 O'Connor 0.561
1995 0.526 0.269 Kennedy 0.740
1996 0.645 0.278 Kennedy 0.739
1997 0.610 0.294 Kennedy 0.919
1998 0.657 0.302 Kennedy 0.574
1999 0.711 0.313 O'Connor 0.901
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2000 0.467 0.340 O'Connor 0.992
2001 0.311 0.367 O'Connor 1.000
2002 0.247 0.415 O'Connor 0.998
Estimates of the location of the median Justice, the posterior standard deviation
(standard error) of the estimate, the Justice with the highest posterior probability
of being the median Justice, and their probability of being the median Justice for
the 1937-2002 Terms.
Again, we could offer any number of observations about the
results displayed in Table 4 but perhaps the most interesting, even
surprising, is the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the identity
of the median Justice. While it is clear that O'Connor has been at the
center in recent years-note the extraordinarily high probabilities of
0.901, 0.992, 1.000 and 0.998 for the 1999-2002 Terms-such certainty
about the median's identity is far from a norm: in twelve of the sixty-
six Terms we analyzed, the highest probability that any one Justice
was the median is less than 0.5; in several Terms, it is as low as 0.3.
What these results suggest is that during a non-trivial fraction of the
years in our data set (12/66 = 0.182), another Justice(s)-and not
merely the so-deemed "median"-played a crucial role in Court
decisions.
B. Attractive Features of the Martin-Quinn Approach
To the extent that the "center" of the Court is not always crystal
clear, this is an intriguing finding-and one that points to a chief
advantage of the Martin-Quinn approach: it enables us to make
rational and coherent probability statements about the quantities of
interest, such as those pertaining to the identity of the Justice with the
highest posterior probability of being the median, along with that
probability. For example: "During the 1999 Term, the probability
that Justice O'Connor was the median Justice is 0.901; Justice
Kennedy held that position with probability 0.099. In other words,
O'Connor was nine times more likely than Kennedy to be the pivot in
1999."
But this is not the only attractive feature of the Martin-Quinn
method. Recall that among the strongest assets of the Segal-Cover
scores is the degree to which they comport with our knowledge of the
Justices. We could say precisely the same of the Martin-Quinn
method. The following discussion provides but a few examples.
In describing Justice Tom Clark's role in search and seizure
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cases, Dorin notes: "Irvine [v. California] marked the end of Clark's
close to five years of silence regarding state searches and seizures. He
had emerged as a major player in its resolution. Indeed, he had been
its 'swing' Justice."79 And, in fact, in 1952 and 1953, Clark emerges,
on the Martin-Quinn estimates, as the Justice with the highest
posterior probability of having been the median.
Powe writes that "[o]nce Arthur Goldberg gave the liberals a
solid majority and William J. Brennan, Jr. became the median Justice,
the transformed Warren Court turned the New Deal constitutional
order into the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order."8
According to the Martin-Quinn estimates, Brennan did indeed
emerge as the median shortly after Goldberg joined the Court.
Numerous sources claim that Justice David Souter, upon his
ascension to the bench, "established himself as an independent
thinker in the middle of the Court's ideological spectrum."'" The
Martin-Quinn estimates for the 1990 and 1991 Terms accord with this
speculation: Souter was the median Justice.
Virtually all contemporary commentary stresses the critical role
Justice O'Connor (and, to a lesser extent, Kennedy) plays on the
current Court by casting key votes in many consequential cases.82
The Martin-Quinn approach confirms this commentary, showing that
O'Connor has been the Court's median since the 1999 Term.
Of course the Segal-Cover scores also appear facially valid. But
on other dimensions important differences exist between the two
measures-at least some of which shore up additional benefits of the
Martin-Quinn approach. The most obvious, as we already have
noted, is that the Martin-Quinn method (but not Segal-Cover)
enables us to generate probabilistic claims about our estimates of the
79. Dennis D. Dorin, Justice Tom Clark's Role in Mapp v. Ohio's Extension of the
Exclusionary Rule To State Searches and Seizures, 52 CASE W. RES. 401, 412 (2001).
80. Powe, supra note 6, at 651.
81. Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-
Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1111, 1130 (1994); see
also Paul M. Barrett, Independent Justice: David Souter Emerges as Reflective Moderate
on the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1993, at Al (predicting that Justice Souter
would become the Court's "moderate center" with the arrival of Clinton-appointed
liberals).
82. See, e.g., Editorial, A Moderate Term on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, at
12 (noting Justice O'Connor's status as the "court's critical swing vote"); Associated Press,
Affirmative Action Case Puts Judges in Spotlight, CHI. TRIB., April 1, 2003, (Magazine), at
36 (describing Justices O'Connor and Kennedy as the "perennial swing voters"); Charles
Lane, Supreme Court: On the Sidelines, for Now, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at A5
(describing Justice O'Connor as the "perennial swing voter").
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median's location.8 3  So, while both the Segal-Cover and Martin-
Quinn scores identify David Souter as the median Justice in the 1990
Term,84 to provide but one illustration, the former cannot convey the
degree of uncertainty surrounding the choice of Souter. This turns
out to be important since the probability that Souter sat at the Court's
center in the 1990 Term is a relatively low 0.479 (especially compared,
with, say, the 2002 figure for O'Connor of 0.998), meaning that
another or other Justices were nearly as central to outcomes.85
So too and in sharp contrast to the Segal-Cover scores, the
Martin-Quinn approach performs well across issue areas. Martin and
83. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
84. As an aside, it is interesting to consider the overlap (or, more pointedly, the lack
thereof) between the Segal-Cover and the Martin-Quinn scores. We already have noted
that for the natural court sitting between 1994 and 2002, the Segal-Cover scores identify
Souter as the median. See supra note 60. The Martin-Quinn approach, in contrast and in
line with virtually all scholarly commentary, points to O'Connor (at least since 1999).
Below we show that, overall, only a weak association exists between the two measures.
(Note that negative association arises because the Segal-Cover measure is a measure of
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85. See Appx. I.
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Quinn recently demonstrated as much in a paper that re-estimates the
model and quantities of interest (including Court medians)
eliminating one legal area at a time.86 Unlike the Segal-Cover
approach, which, as we noted earlier, has difficulty locating the
median outside the civil liberties realm,8 7 the Martin-Quinn method
generally identifies the same Justice as the Court's center regardless
of the legal issue at stake in the litigation.88
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE MARTIN-QUINN ESTIMATES
If we have made a convincing case for the Martin-Quinn
estimates of the median, then applications are virtually limitless.
Scholars can deploy these estimates to address a range of questions,
whether pertaining to intra-organizational issues (such as agenda
setting and opinion assignment) or the Court's relationship with the
other branches of government, the lower courts, and the states.89
Indeed, any research that has previously invoked votes, party
affiliations, or the Segal-Cover scores to locate the median Justice can
now employ the Martin-Quinn estimates-and can do so without
confronting the substantial drawbacks of those other approaches. So,
for example, the Martin-Quinn method does not suffer from the same
"circularity" problem that plagues the use of votes: by purging the
particular issue area of interest and recomputing the Martin-Quinn
estimates, they are perfectly appropriate for use in studies of Court
decisionmaking; deploying the estimates in this way, in other words,
would not amount to using votes to predict votes.9° By the same
token, they are a far more efficient indicator of ideology than party
affiliation, and they perform adequately, as we have just noted and in
contrast to the Segal-Cover scores, across a range of legal questions.
86. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimates Be Used as
Explanatory Variables?, Washington University in St. Louis typescript (2004), available at
http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
87. See Epstein & Mershon, supra note 15.
88. The estimated locations of the medians always correlate above 0.9 when deleting
an issue at a time; and the method identifies the same Justice as the median Justice eighty-
seven percent of the time as Court's center regardless of the legal issue at stake in the
litigation. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 86. The only differences are in terms where
there is much uncertainty about who is the median Justice, such as Justice Burton in 1949.
Id.
89. Analysts already have put the Martin-Quinn scores to use to investigate the
Court's interactions with Congress. See Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the
Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 134-39 (2003).
90. Martin & Quinn introduce this approach. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 86. On
the other hand, this paper demonstrates that as an empirical issue, it matters not if
scholars invoke the purged estimates or those based on all votes.
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In light of space limitations, we leave it to others to flesh out fully
applications of the Martin-Quinn estimates. We focus instead on
demonstrating how we might employ the estimates to examine two
emerging pieces of wisdom about the Court; namely, that (1) the
Court, particularly Justice O'Connor, has moved to the "left" or, at
least, has grown more moderate in recent Terms and (2) the next
President will be able to "remake" the Court.
A. A More Moderate Court (O'Connor)?
In a recent newspaper article, the long-time Court commentator,
Joan Biskupic wrote that "[a]lthough [Justice] O'Connor usually
votes with the court's conservative wing, she increasingly has sided
with liberals in significant cases that have been decided by 5-4 votes.
It's led some conservative observers to wonder whether O'Connor, at
74, is turning to the left."91
To the extent that many commentators-regardless of their
ideological, epistemological, or methodological orientation-seem to
think that O'Connor and, thus, the Court itself has grown more
moderate over time, Biskupic is correct.92 They, like Biskupic, point
to recent Court decisions upholding Michigan Law School's use of
race in admissions,93 the Family Medical Leave Act,94 and parts of the
McCain-Feingold campaign finance act,95 not to mention the
eradication of Texas's sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas.96 In all four,
91. Joan Biskupic, O'Connor Not Confined by Conservatism, USA TODAY, June 24,
2004, at 4A.
92. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a Conservative Supreme Court: The
October 2000 Term, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 311-13 (2003) (arguing that the
Rehnquist Court is more activist to the left than the right); Christopher E. Smith &
Madhavi McCall, Criminal Justice and the 2001-02 United States Supreme Court Term,
2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413, 418 (2003) ("In the [2001-02] term.. . Sandra Day O'Connor,
joined her more liberal colleagues to form five-member majorities in all three closely-
divided decisions favoring claims of individuals."); Alex Daniels, RETAIL: Unbridled
Court to Rule on Size of Wal-Mart Suit, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 2004 ("In
past years... the 9th was overturned more often than other circuits. Last term's results
might indicate the circuit is getting more moderate .... Also, it could mean the Supreme
Court is issuing more liberal-leaning decisions."); Charles Lane, Courting O'Connor; Why
the Chief Justice Isn't the Chief Justice, WASH. POST, July 4, 2004, (Magazine), at W10
("The Michigan cases erased much of the animosity liberals harbored against O'Connor
for Bush v. Gore-and enraged the right."); Charles Rothfeld, The Court on Balance; By
Sometimes Leaning Left, Justice O'Connor Centers the Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, July
12, 2004, at 52 ("The liberals.., dominated in the eight civil cases decided by 5-4 votes,
winning six of them. O'Connor voted with the liberal majority in four of these cases.").
93. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
94. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
95. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
96. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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O'Connor was in the majority and likely critical for the creation of
the prevailing coalitions at that. But to what extent can we generalize
from these cases? Do they represent a significant turn to the left on
the part of the Court (O'Connor) or mere anomalies, though hardly
inconsequential ones?
To explore these questions, we used the Martin-Quinn estimates
to plot, in Figure 6, the ideal points of Sandra Day O'Connor and of
the median Justice (solid black circles indicate the overlap) over the
last two decades. We also show the "cutpoint" for Grutter v.
Bollinger,97 such that during Terms above the line, the odds are that
the Court would have struck down the Michigan affirmative action
program and during Terms below it, the Court, in all likelihood,
would have upheld it (as it did in the 2002 Term).98
From this figure we can lend systematic support to the informed
speculation that O'Connor (the Court) has taken a turn to the left.
Note that O'Connor's line appears to drift downward, indicating
increased liberal voting on her part. To be more precise, at the start
of the current natural court era in 1994, O'Connor's ideal point sat at
a relatively conservative 0.637; by the 2002 Term, it had moved to
0.247. By any measure this is quite an impressive shift but, we hasten
to note, we should not take it to mean that O'Connor is now a
downright liberal. She is still quite a distance from the most left-
leaning Justice in our data (William 0. Douglas in the 1974 Term
with a score of -6.31). 99 She is also far from the most liberal median
since 1937; that distinction belongs to Stanley F. Reed in the 1939
Term (with a score of -0.978). On the other hand, the leftward trend
in the data is so unmistakable that it is hard to deny claims in recent
writings about the emergence of a more moderate Supreme Court.
Figure 6 is interesting in its own. right if only because it provides
empirical evidence of the veracity of contemporary characterizations
of the Court. But our results also have implications both for
empirical and doctrinal analyses of judicial decisionmaking. From an
empirical standpoint, as we noted earlier, they draw attention to the
utility of the "natural court" as a conceptual and analytic device. Our
findings also may call into question an assumption underlying many
97. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
98. The cutpoint is the point in the ideological space that is halfway between the
policy position of an affirm vote and a reverse vote. A Justice whose ideal point is at the
cutpoint is indifferent between the two outcomes. A bit of algebra reveals that the
cutpoint is a simple function of the a and fi parameters introduced in Section IV.
99. In the Appendix to this Article, we supply Martin-Quinn estimates of the ideal
points of all Justices for all terms between 1937 and 2002.
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theories of decisionmaking; namely, that the Justices' policy
preferences remain stable over time.1° A mere glance at Figure 6's
depiction of the median's ideal point during the 1994-2002 Terms and
of O'Connor's across the entire period should dispel any doubt that
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Term
Time series plot of Justice O'Connor's and the median's estimated ideal point,
1981-2002 Terms. The solid black circles indicate that Justice O'Connor is most
likely the median Justice. The horizontal line indicates the cutpoint for Grutter v.
Bollinger such that points above the line indicate a probability of greater than
0.50 of voting to strike down the program; those below the line indicate a greater
than 0.50 probability of voting to uphold the program (as the Court did in the
2002 Term).
100. For more on this point, see Martin & Quinn, supra note 17; Lee Epstein et al., Do
Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J.
POL. 801, 801-02 (1998).
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From a doctrinal perspective, O'Connor's (and the Court's) turn
to the left is more than a mere aggregation of votes and probabilities;
it has been of some consequence at the individual case level as well.
We illustrate just one example with the horizontal line in Figure 6
indicating the Grutter cutpoint (again, points north of the line indicate
a probability of greater than 0.50 of voting against the program; those
south of the line indicate a greater than 0.50 probability of voting for
the program). Notice that in 1994, at the start of the current natural
Court era, the probability of the Court supporting the Michigan Law
affirmative action program was just 0.318. Only in 2001 and 2002 did
that figure increase to 0.500 or greater. To think about it another
way, the likelihood of O'Connor providing the key vote to uphold the
program was quite small for any Term prior to 2001: for example, in
the 1999 Term it was a slim 0.228; the probability increased to 0.387 in
2000, but only beginning in 2001 did it surpass the 0.500 mark (0.507
in 2001 and 0.504 in 2002).
B. A New Court?
The critical role O'Connor plays on the current Court has not, as
we have emphasized throughout, gone unnoticed. Earlier this year
Forbes Magazine ranked her as the sixth most powerful woman in
America, right behind Hillary Rodham Clinton;101 and just this past
winter Michael S. Greve quipped that "[i]t's Sandra Day O'Connor's
country; the rest of us just dance to her fiddle."'12
But for how much longer? In light of O'Connor's age (seventy-
four)13 and the length of her service on the Court (twenty-three
years) l0" rumors about a possible retirement abound. 0 5 Along with
101. Elizabeth MacDonald & Chana R. Schoenberger, The World's 100 Most Powerful
Women (Aug. 20, 2004), at http://www.forbes.com/2004/08/18/04powomland.html (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
102. Michael S. Greve, The Term the Constitution Died, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227,
227 (2004).
103. Justice O'Connor was born on March 26, 1930. 2 JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WITr,
GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 956 (3d ed. 1997).
104. Justice O'Connor was nominated to the Court by Ronald Reagan on August 19,
1981 and confirmed by the Senate on September 21, 1981. Id.
105. See, e.g., Geo Beach, Real Alaskans Like Political Wild Cards, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS (Alaska), Aug. 14, 2004, at B6 ("Sandra Day O'Connor is only [sic] 70, but
she's been fighting a cancer and may also be considering retirement."); Michael Kirkland,
Analysis: Peering Into the High Court's Future, Aug. 27, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library,
News file (stating that the "the 74-year-old O'Connor has been the subject of retirement
rumors for years"); Ana Radelat, Federalists Could Have More Influence on the Supreme
Court, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 26, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News file
("Retirement rumors ... have swirled around... Sandra Day O'Connor, 74."); Thomas B.
131120051
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the rumors has come a good deal of speculation about the
fundamental changes an O'Connor departure would bring to extant
law and policy. As one commentator put it, "[i]f O'Connor steps
down it would be the judicial equivalent of an earthquake. Replacing
her with either a consistent conservative or liberal would affect the
majorities on a broad range of issues."' 6
Both the Kerry and Bush camps apparently agreed and
attempted to convince voters to make the speculation a part of their
calculus. 107  But to what extent does it hold? In particular, if
O'Connor (or now, more likely, Rehnquist) resigns within the next
four years, will George W. Bush have an opportunity to "remake" the
Court, that is, push it further to the right? To what extent does his
ability do so hinge on a Republican-controlled Senate, which Bush
managed to maintain in the wake of the 2004 elections but plausibly
could see vanish in 2006? Finally, by losing to Bush in the recent
presidential contest, what opportunities to change the direction of the
Court did the Democrats forego?
We explore these questions in Figure 7, in which we offer four
plots-one a piece for O'Connor and Rehnquist, 1°8 the Justices of
primary interest here, along with the two others over the age of
seventy:109 Stevens (eighty-four)110 and Ginsburg (seventy-one)"'. In
Scheffey, CONN. LAW TRIB., Mar. 29, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News file ("Sandra
Day O'Connor [is] believed close to retirement.").
106. Kirkland, supra note 105.
107. See C.T. Revere, Campaign 2004, TUCSON CITIZEN, May 1, 2004, LEXIS, Nexis
Library, News file. Revere points to a Kerry television commercial warning voters that
the Court is just "one vote away from outlawing a woman's right to choose." The ad,
according to a Kerry spokesperson, is "based on the potential impact of the retirement of
Arizona native Sandra Day O'Connor, who is considered a swing vote on the abortion
issue." Id.
108. Rehnquist was born on October 1, 1924. BISKUPIC & wiTr, supra note 103, at
954.
109. By plotting the four oldest Justices we do not mean to suggest that age is the only
or even chief factor motivating a retirement decision. In fact, some commentary suggests
that strategic considerations are paramount; i.e., Justices consider who will replace them
when deciding whether or not to step down from the bench. See, e.g., Kirkland, supra note
106 ("Whether [Rehnquist] retires in the next four years probably will be determined by
whether President George W. Bush or a putative President John F. Kerry gets the chance
to replace him."). This is an interesting idea but one that deserves far more careful
consideration than we could possibly devote to it here. Our purpose instead is to consider
several possible scenarios-a category into which departures by O'Connor, Stevens,
Rehnquist, and Ginsburg surely fall. Savage makes this clear when he points to these four
as the leading candidates: "Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 71, has battled cancer since
1999. Justice John Paul Stevens is 84. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 79, and Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, 74, are said to have eyed retirement for several years." Charlie
Savage, Next Administration Could Get To Name 4 Justices, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7, 2004,
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each panel, the horizontal axis is the predicted location of the ideal
point of the median Justice, such that the lower (negative) numbers
indicate liberal medians and the higher (positive) numbers indicate
conservative medians. The dashed line denotes the current position
of the median Justice (Sandra Day O'Connor); the black dots indicate
the predicted (new) location of the median Justice contingent upon
the ideology of the key players involved in the appointment and
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: the President and the
Senate.
To see how these plots facilitate the development of predictions
about the effect Bush may have (and Kerry might have had) on the
Court, consider the Stevens and Ginsburg panels (which return
identical results). Notice that should either retire the Court's median
would not have budged had Kerry become President. Nor do we
foresee a change under a Bush administration and a Democratic
Senate. Under current circumstances, however, with both the
executive branch and the Senate under Republican control, odds are
that the median will move considerably. In fact, the resulting Court
could very well go on to become the most right-leaning since 1952 (a
median location of 0.869 in, e.g., 2005 versus 1.031 in the 1952 Term.)
The prediction works in the reverse for Rehnquist. If he leaves
during a Bush presidency and a Republican-dominated Senate, as
might well be the case, we anticipate little change in the median
Justice and, thus, the outcomes of Court cases. But, should the Chief
retire during a period of divided government (e.g., a Bush presidency
and a Democratic Senate) or should he leave under a Democratic
administration, we forecast substantial change: the apres-Rehnquist
Court might have emerged as among the most liberal in recent
memory, with a median in the neighborhood of -0.8 (depending on
assumptions about the precise location of the Senate) versus -0.841 in
1967, the most liberal Term since 1950.
at A3. More recently, speculation has centered almost exclusively on Rehnquist in light of
his battle with thyroid cancer.
110. Stevens was born on April 20, 1920. Id. at 955.
111. Ginsburg was born on March 15, 1933. Id. at 961.
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Location of the Court Median
Predicted location of the median Justice for a vacancy on the Supreme Court.
The horizontal axis is the predicted location of the ideal point of the median
Justice, such that the lower (negative) numbers indicate liberal medians and the
higher (positive) numbers indicate conservative medians. The dashed line
denotes the current position of the median Justice (Sandra Day O'Connor); the
black dots indicate the predicted (new) location of the median Justice contingent
upon the ideology of the President and the Senate. We estimated these positions
using Sala and Spriggs's method.
In the case of a Rehnquist retirement, then, continuity-and not
change-is likely to result, assuming the Chief leaves sooner rather
than later. This is not true of Sandra Day O'Connor. Under no
112. See Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, II, Designing Tests of the Supreme Court
and the Separation of Powers, POL. RES. Q. (June 2004).
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circumstances that we considered will the median remain "as is"
should she retire; actually, as Figure 7 depicts, rather substantial
ideological swings are quite likely. Some are entirely predictable; for
example, had the Democrats regained control of the Senate and the
presidency, Kerry quite possibly could have pushed the Court to
near-record levels of liberalism. Now, under a unified Republican
government, Bush could do the same except, of course, in the
opposite direction. But at least one result is unexpected: Under a
Bush presidency and a Democratic Senate (say, in 2007), odds are
that the Court's median will move-though to the left, not the right
(from its current location of 0.247 to -0.700).
So to return to the question we posed at the outset: will a Sandra
Day O'Connor departure provide the next President with an
opportunity to remake the Court? Our response is clearly in the
affirmative for the Democrats. Regardless of the composition of the
Senate, the data suggest that had Kerry won the election he would
have been in the near-historic position to move the Court-and,
crucially, to move the Court in a direction that favored his vision of
public policy. To the extent that O'Connor's retirement may enable
Bush too to move the Court, he is in much the same position as Kerry
would have found himself-with one very critical distinction: only
with a Republican Senate in play will Bush, in all likelihood, be able
to shape it in a way that reflects his political preferences. Should the
Democrats gain a majority in the Senate, an O'Connor retirement
ought not be at the top of Bush's wish list, as a more liberal Court is
likely to result. Far better off from the current President's
perspective would be a Stevens or Ginsburg resignation, which would
result in the status quo or a more right-leaning Court depending on
the composition of the Senate.
CONCLUSION
Theorizing and analyzing the Court's "center" could take many
forms. We have considered but one approach to each: a
conceptualization that relies on social science theories about the
importance of the median voter and a method that enables us to
estimate the identity of that voter and her location, and to quantify
the degree of uncertainty we have about those estimates.
Without belying the importance of other approaches-be they
jurisprudential, doctrinal, interpretive, statistical, or mathematical-
we hope ours has something to offer to the study of centrist judges.
We worked to demonstrate as much via two applications, the first of
which confirmed the received wisdom about the Court's
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(O'Connor's) turn to the left. The second offered a more nuanced
response: an O'Connor departure would, in all likelihood, generate
real change on the Court though perhaps in unexpected ways.
These are but two applications of the Martin-Quinn estimates;
we can conjure up many other possibilities and we trust other
investigators can do the same. More than that we hope the method
we presented here proves useful for the study of all Justices and not
exclusively for analyses of the median. To that end we have included
an appendix that houses estimates of the ideal points of each and
every Justice who has served since the 1937 Term."3 Potential uses
for these scores, we believe, are highly variegated. Studies of the
effect of public opinion, the economy, and crime (to name but a few
socio-legal factors) on the decisions of particular Justices, along with
investigations into agenda setting, opinion assignment, and the many
other processes internal to the Court are just some of the
possibilities-as are, of course, any number of normative and
empirical projects related to the crucially important and ever-
intriguing "center" of the Court.
113. We encourage scholars to check the website http://adm.wustl.edu/supct.php for
updates; the 2003 Term data should be available by December 2004.
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APPENDIX: MARTIN-QUINN SCORES FOR ALL JUSTICES, 1937-2002
1937 Black -2.852 1942 Frankfurter 0.416 1985 Rehnquist 3.375
1938 Black -3.126 1943 Frankfurter 0.420 1986 Rehnquist 3.139
1939 Black -3.206 1944 Frankfurter 0.406 1987 Rehnquist 2.732
1940 Black -3.229 1945 Frankfurter 0.661 1988 Rehnquist 2.597
1941 Black -3.113 1946 Frankfurter 1.015 1989 Rehnquist 2.421
1942 Black -2.850 1947 Frankfurter 0.894 1990 Rehnquist 2.173
1943 Black -2.525 1948 Frankfurter 0.637 1991 Rehnquist 1.876
1944 Black -2.409 1949 Frankfurter 0.363 1992 Rehnquist 1.816
1945 Black -2.029 1950 Frankfurter 0.225 1993 Rehnquist 1.636
1946 Black -1.850 1951 Frankfurter 0.074 1994 Rehnquist 1.641
1947 Black -1.726 1952 Frankfurter 0.051 1995 Rehnquist 1,616
1948 Black -1.580 1953 Frankfurter 0,370 1996 Rehnquist 1.477
1949 Black -1,625 1954 Frankfurter 0.370 1997 Rehnquist 1.426
1950 Black -1.584 1955 Frankfurter 0.679 1998 Rehnquist 1.625
1951 Black -1.473 1956 Frankfurter 0.875 1999 Rehnquist 1.574
1952 Black -1.177 1957 Frankfurter 1.246 2000 Rehnquist 1.567
1953 Black -1.514 1958 Frankfurter 1.561 2001 Rehnquist 1.298
1954 Black -1.575 1959 Frankfurter 1.720 2002 Rehnquist 1.073
1955 Black -1.855 1960 Frankfurter 1.789 1937 Roerts -0.037
1956 Black -2.037 1961 Frankfurter 1.800 1938 Roberts 0.370
1957 Black -2.095 1993 Ginsburg -0.303 1939 Roberts 1.012
1958 Black -1.980 1994 Ginsburg -0.555 1940 Roberts 1.689
1959 Black -1.943 1995 Ginsburg -0,624 1941 Roberts 1.884
1960 Black -1.815 1996 Ginsburg -0.830 1942 Roberts 2.141
1961 Black -1.721 1997 Ginsburg -1.047 1943 Roberts 2.518
1962 Black -1.639 1998 Ginsburg -1.272 1944 Roberts 2.883
1963 Black -1.416 1999 Ginsburg -1.613 1942 Rutledge -1.079
1964 Black -0.936 2000 Ginsburg -1,679 1943 Rutledge -1.118
1965 Black -0.576 2001 Ginsburg -1.677 1944 Rutledge -1.280
1966 Black -0.295 2002 Ginsburg -1.642 1945 Rutledge -1.097
1967 Black -0.092 1962 Goldberg -0.770 1946 Rutledge -1.343
1968 Black 0.001 1963 Goldberg -0.907 1947 Rutledge 1.677
1969 Black 0.086 1964 Goldberg -0.561 1948 Rutledge 1.764
1970 Black 0.063 1954 Harlan 0.869 1986 Scalia 1.378
1970 Blackmun 1850 1955 Harlan 1,090 1987 Scalia 1.526
1971 Blackmun 1.805 1956 Harlan 1.305 1988 Scalia 1.657
1972 Blackmun 1.455 1957 Harlan 1.596 1989 Scalia 1.835
1973 Blackmun 1.307 1958 Harlan 1.724 1990 Scalia 1.985
1974 Blackmun 1.029 1959 Harlan 1.856 1991 Scalia 2.300
1975 Blackmun 0.856 1960 Harlan 1.944 1992 Scalia 2.318
1976 Blackmun 0.633 1961 Harlan 2.236 1993 Scalia 2.401
1977 Blackmun 0.262 1962 Harlan 2.461 1994 Scalia 2.649
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1978 Blackmun 0.105 1963 Harlan 2.473 1995 Scalia 2.925
1979 Blackmun -0.069 1964 Harlan 2.285 1996 Scalia 3.184
1980 Blackmun -0.153 1965 Harlan 2.153 1997 Scalia 3.321
1981 Blackmun -0.469 1966 Harlan 1.840 1998 Scalia 3.397
1982 Blackmun -0.543 1967 Harlan 1.286 1999 Scalia 3.570
1983 Blackmun -0.093 1968 Harlan 0.778 2000 Scalia 3.696
1984 Blackmun -0.218 1969 Harlan 0.663 2001 Scalia 3707
1985 Blackmun -0.765 1970 Harlan 0.569 2002 Scalia 3.613
1986 Blackmun -0.928 1937 Hughes -0.434 1990 Saurrr 0.942
1987 Blackmun -0.930 1938 Hughes -0.289 1991 Satter 0.558
1988 Blackmun -0.963 1939 Hughes 0.299 1992 Souer 0.156
1909 Blackmun -0.845 1940 Hughes 0.832 1993 Scter -0,359
1990 Blackmun -1.148 1941 Jackson 0.225 1994 Sauter -0.508
1991 Blackmun -1.393 1942 Jackson 0.269 1995 Sater -0.541
1992 Blackmun -1.542 1943 Jackson 0.184 1996 Sater -0.582
1993 Blackmun -1.806 1944 Jackson 0.231 1997 Sauter -0.731
1937 Brandeis -0.514 1945 Jackson 0.634 1998 Snarer -0.847
1938 Brandeis -0.474 1946 Jackson 1.026 1999 Soaer -1.188
1956 Brennan -0.590 1947 Jackson 1.156 2000 Sauter -1.304
1957 Brennan -0.714 1948 Jackson 1.297 2001 Snurer -1.392
1958 Brennan -0.712 1949 Jackson 0,898 2002 Sauter -1.386
1959 Brennan -0.868 1950 Jackson 0.785 1975 Stevens 0.035
1960 Brennan -0.874 1951 Jackson 0,707 1976 Stevens -0.125
1961 Brennan -0.728 1952 Jackson 0.924 1977 Stevens -0.015
1962 Brennan -0.967 1953 Jackson 0.840 1978 Stevens -0.291
1963 Brennan -0.825 1987 Kennedy 1.112 1979 Stevens -0.268
1964 Brennan -0.685 1988 Kennedy 1.385 1980 Stevens -0.265
1965 Brennan -0.844 1989 Kennedy 1.290 1981 Stevens -0.250
1966 Brennan -0.994 1990 Kennedy 1.090 1902 Stevens -0.546
1967 Brennan -1.039 1991 Kennedy 0.732 1983 Stevens -0.593
1968 Brennan -0.911 1992 Kennedy 0.878 1984 Stevens -0.487
1969 Brennan -0.830 1993 Kennedy 0.719 1985 Stevens -0.468
1970 Brennan -0.932 1994 Kennedy 0.666 1986 Stevens -0.578
1971 Brennan -1.088 1995 Kennedy 0.555 1987 Stevens -0.509
1972 Brennan -1.351 1996 Krnaedy 0.672 1988 Stevens -0.631
1973 Brennan -1.675 1997 Kennedy 0,617 1989 Stevens -1.026
1974 Brennan -1.951 1998 Kennedy 0.715 1990 Stevens -1.713
1975 Brennan -2.528 1999 Kennedy 0,951 1991 Stevens -2.088
1976 Brennan -2.809 2000 Kennedy 0.888 1992 Stevens -2.249
1977 Brennan -2.918 2001 Kennedy 1.011 1993 Stevens -2.451
1978 Brennan -2.894 2002 Kennedy 0,902 1994 Stevens -2.802
1979 Brennan -2.853 1967 Marshall -0.898 1995 Stevens -3.021
1980 Brennan -2.693 1968 Marshall -0.911 1996 Stevens -3.118
1981 Brennan -2.672 1969 Marshall -0.848 1997 Stevens -3.072
2005] THE MEDIAN JUSTICE 1319
1982 Brennan -2.504 1970 Marshall -0.883 1998 Stevens -3.021
1983 Brennan -2.807 1971 Marshall -0.983 1999 Stevens -2.931
1984 Brennan -3.015 1972 Mershall -1.277 2000 Stevens -2.789
1985 Brennan -3.113 1973 Marshall -1.444 2001 Stevens -2.715
1986 Brennan -3,370 1974 Marshall -1.473 2002 Stevens -2.616
1987 Brennan -3.443 1975 Marshall -2.041 1958 Stewart 0.883
1988 Brennan -3.538 1976 Marshall -2.341 1959 Stewart 0.651
1989 Brennan -3.582 1977 Marshall -2.626 1960 Stewart 0.531
1994 Breyer -0.474 1978 Marshall -3.002 1961 Stewart 0.483
1995 Breyer -0.705 1979 Marshall -3.262 1962 Stewart 0.651
1996 Breyer -0.947 1980 Marshall -3.437 1963 Stewart 0.484
1997 Breyer -1.022 1981 Marshall -3.555 1964 Stewart 0.647
1998 Breyer -1.009 1982 Marshall -3.722 1965 Stewart 0.829
1999 Breyer -0.993 1983 Marshall -3.770 1966 Stewart 0.907
2000 Breyer -1.356 1984 Marshall -3.838 1967 Stewart 0.468
2001 Breyer -1.383 1985 Marshall -3.913 1968 Stewart 0.662
2002 Breyer -1,400 1986 Marshall -4.093 1969 Stewart 0.623
1969 Burger 1.941 1987 Marshall -4.238 0970 Stewart 0.604
1970 Burger 2.185 1988 Marshall -4.310 1971 Stewart 0.210
1971 Burger 2.425 1989 Marshall -4.284 1972 Stewart 0.189
1972 Burger 2,238 1990 Marshall -4.124 1973 Stewart 0.543
1973 Burger 2.171 1937 McReynolds 2.813 1974 Stewart 0.409
1974 Burger 2.107 1938 MeReynolds 2.814 1975 Stewart 0.529
1975 Burger 1.968 1939 McReynolds 2.576 1976 Stewart 0.483
1976 Burger 1.869 1940 McReynolds 2.059 1977 Stewart 0,314
1977 Burger 1.546 1949 Minton 1.120 1978 Stewart 0.544
1978 Burger 1.408 1950 Minton 1.274 1979 Stewart 0.476
1979 Burger 1.174 1951 Minton 1.331 1980 Stewart 0.656
1980 Burger 1.346 1952 Minton 1.156 1937 Stone -0.780
1981 Burger 1.464 1953 Minton 0.818 1938 Stone -0.750
1982 Burger 1.321 1954 Minton 0.845 1939 Stone -0.752
1983 Burger 1.498 1955 Minton 0.889 1940 Stone -0.308
1904 Burger 1,820 1939 Murphy -1.528 1941 Stone 0.404
1985 Burger 1.957 1940 Murphy -1.404 1942 Stone 0.267
1945 Burton 0.485 1941 Murphy -1.435 1943 Stone 0.172
1946 Burton 0.538 1942 Murphy -1.579 1944 Stone 0514
1947 Burton 0.873 1943 Murphy -1,671 1945 Stone 0.573
1948 Burton 0.942 1944 Murphy -1.392 1937 Sutherland 1.966
1949 Burton 0.933 1945 Murphy -1,283 1991 Thomas 2.605
1950 Burton 0.949 1946 Murphy -1.705 1992 Thomas 2.854
1951 Burton 0.893 1947 Murphy -1.643 1993 Thomas 3.190
1952 Burton 1.185 1948 Murphy -1.523 1994 Thomas 3.363
1953 Burton 1,271 1981 O'Connor 1.461 1995 Thomas 3.437
1954 Burton 1.240 1982 O'Connor 1.610 1996 Thomas 3,513
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